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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The City accepts the statement of appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Article I Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
1 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(Second paragraph omitted) 
§ 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the 
same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was 
or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in 
the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
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(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, 
set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a 
fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) (Omitted) 
(3) (Omitted) 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been 
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) the court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) there is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any 
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judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a 
matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it 
impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trail. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Chapter 12 (relevant portions) 
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office 
impartially and diligently. 
E. Disqualification 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in 
a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but 
not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party or a party's 
lawyer, a strong personal bias involving 
an issue in a case, or personal knowledge 
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning 
the proceeding; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City accepts the statement of the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The defendant Randy Patten was charged with violation of a 
protective order, § 76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, which is a Class 
A Misdemeanor. The prosecution was commenced by the filing of three 
separate informations on or about February 28, 1997 (case 
#971000887, case #971000888, and case #971000889). Record, P. 1, 
45. 
2. On or about June 23, 1997, a bench trial was conducted 
before the Honorable Judge Ronald Nehring. The trial encompassed 
all three charges, which had been consolidated. Record, P. 56. 
3. Upon commencement of the trial, witnesses were sworn and 
testified on behalf of the prosecution. Record, P. 179 
4. During the testimony of Randy Patten's wife, Susan Patten, 
the alleged victim, it came to the attention of the Court that 
Susan Patten was being represented in her divorce action against 
Randy Patten by the wife of an assistant West Valley City 
prosecutor. Transcript, P. 42-45 
5. When this issue arose during the questioning of Susan 
Patten, Judge Nehring declared a recess. Transcript, P. 45. During 
the recess, Judge Nehring spoke with the attorneys in his chambers. 
Record, P. 172. 
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6. Following the recess, Judge Nehring declared a mistrial. 
Judge's Ruling, P. 2. He also announced that he was going to 
reassign the case to another judge since, during the discussions, 
he had learned information about the case which was beyond the 
information presented by the witnesses and beyond the record in the 
case. Judge Nehring announced that, "In my view, my continued 
involvement on this case would be inappropriate." Judge's Ruling, 
P. 3. 
7. On November 3, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy and improper termination grounds. 
Record, P. 169. The defendant's motion was heard at oral argument 
by the Honorable Judge Judith S.H. Atherton on January 26, 1998. 
Record, P. 171. 
8. On March 18, 1998, Judge Atherton denied the defendant's 
motion by Memorandum Decision wherein she found Judge Nehring's 
recusal from the case constituted a clear and compelling reason for 
a mistrial and that retrial of the defendant was not barred by the 
principles of double jeopardy. Record, P. 172. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I• JUDGE ATHERTON CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDGE 
NEHRING'S DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL IN 
THIS CASE WAS NOT IMPROPER AND THAT THE 
REPROSECUTION OF RANDY PATTEN IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
a. Thexmanifest necessity' mistrial exception to double jeopardy 
and the statutory exception in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. 
The United States and Utah Constitutions bar retrial following 
a declaration of mistrial unless the mistrial was declared based 
upon a ^manifest necessity.' This concept has been codified in 
Utah as §76-1-403 Utah Code Annotated. 
b. Judge Nehring' s recusal and reassignment of the case is 
^manifest necessity' for a mistrial and falls within the 
exceptions contained in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. 
Judge Atherton correctly determined and ruled that Judge 
Nehring's declaration of a mistrial in this case was not a bar to 
retrial on grounds of double jeopardy. Although the parties argued 
other grounds for the mistrial, Judge Atherton held that Judge 
Nehring' s recusal on the grounds that he had been privy to too much 
information about the case was a basis for finding that retrial was 
not barred by §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. Furthermore, the 
midtrial, sua sponte, recusal of a judge for bias or potential bias 
is required by the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and falls squarely 
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within the ^manifest necessity' exception to the double jeopardy 
provisions. 
Also, since the trial judge is the person who is in the best 
position to judge his own potential bias or the appearance of bias 
on his part, his decision to recuse should be given great 
deference. 
c. The trial courts failure to use the phase xlegal necessity' or 
^manifest necessity' in it's rulings does not affect the 
correctness of Judge Atherton's decision. 
The trial courts failure to use the correct legal terminology 
in reaching their decisions is not a fatal error, since an adequate 
basis for finding ^manifest necessity' can be found in the record. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. JUDGE ATHERTON CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDGE 
NEHRING'S DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL IN 
THIS CASE WAS NOT IMPROPER AND THAT THE 
REPROSECUTION OF RANDY PATTEN IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
a. The^manifest necessity' mistrial exception to double jeopardy 
and the statutory exception in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. 
This case is an appeal of the Memorandum Ruling of Judge 
Atherton denying the Defendant Randy Patten's ("Patten") motion to 
dismiss all charges on the grounds of double jeopardy. A thorough 
examination of the case law indicates that Judge Atherton's ruling 
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was correct and that, based upon the information found in the 
record, a mistrial in this case was a manifest necessity. 
The analysis found in Patten's brief regarding the doctrine of 
double jeopardy is accurate. In the case of bar, West Valley City 
("City") agrees that since this was a bench trial and a witness had 
been sworn, that jeopardy had attached. The City also agrees that 
Patten did not consent to the termination of the trial, nor did he 
waive his right to object to the termination of the trial. Under 
circumstances such as this, the double jeopardy clauses of both the 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 
12, Utah State Constitution, bar retrial of the defendant unless 
the mistrial was based upon circumstances that amount to a 
^manifest necessity'. As Judge Atherton correctly concluded, such 
manifest necessity is apparent in this case. 
The original standard for an exception to double jeopardy for 
a mistrial based upon a ^manifest necessity' was set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 
(1824). In Utah, the doctrine of double jeopardy and its exceptions 
have been codified at Section 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. State 
v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993). 
Utah Courts have consistently recognized that the double 
jeopardy provisions do not bar retrial when a mistrial has been 
declared for reasons of manifest necessity. Many Utah courts, have 
used the phrase xlegal necessity,' rather than the more common 
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phrase ^manifest necessity, ' however, it is clear that the terms 
are synonymous. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979). 
b. Judge Nehring's recusal and reassignment of the case is 
^manifest necessity' for a mistrial and falls within the 
exceptions contained in §76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. 
A close examination of the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge 
Atherton on March 18, 1998, indicates that her decision was based 
solely on Judge Nehring's decision to recuse himself. Judge 
Atherton held that: 
The basis of the judge's reassignment of the case to 
another judge is a clear and compelling basis for 
declaring a mistrial under Section U.C.A. 76-1-
403(4) (c) (iii) (Supp.1997), ^prejudicial conduct in or 
out of the court room not attributable to the state, 
mak[ing] it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or state'. 
Record, p. 173. 
The Utah Code section referred to above by Judge Atherton is 
a specific statutory exception to the bar against retrial and is 
analogous to the ^manifest necessity' mistrial exception to the 
constitutional double jeopardy provisions. Judge Atherton also 
stated that since the record supported the declaration of a 
mistrial based upon Judge Nehring's recusal, she need not address 
other arguments. Since it is Judge Atherton's Memorandum Decision 
which is the subject of this appeal, it is appropriate to closely 
examine the basis for that decision, which was Judge Nehring's 
decision to recuse himself. 
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While there appears to be no Utah case law directly on point, 
the relationship between a judge's decision to recuse himself and 
the double jeopardy bar against reprosecution has been examined by 
several other jurisdictions. Those courts have been very clear that 
the midtrial recusal of a judge constitutes ^manifest necessity' 
for purposes of the mistrial exception to the double jeopardy rule. 
In this case, Judge Nehring was faced with the appearance of 
an impropriety when it was discovered that a key prosecution 
witness was being represented in her divorce action against Patten 
by the wife of an assistant West Valley City Prosecutor. When this 
issue arose during the questioning of the witness, Judge Nehring 
declared a recess. Transcript, p. 42-45. During the recess, Judge 
Nehring spoke with the attorneys in his chambers. Record, p. 172. 
Apparently, it was during this discussion that Judge Nehring became 
privy to additional information about the case beyond that which 
had been entered into evidence. The court docket states xxJudge 
Nehring recused himself based on discussions of resolution as Court 
was trying to solve the issue of conflict of interest." Record 
p.179-180. Following the recess, Judge Nehring declared a mistrial. 
Among the statements Judge Nehring placed on the record when 
declaring the mistrial was the following: 
I am going to reassign the case because I have 
participated in discussions of possible resolutions to 
the case, I know a considerable amount about this case 
beyond what I have heard from witnesses and beyond what's 
on the record in the case. And in my view, my continuing 
involvement in this case would be inappropriate... 
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Judge's Ruling, p. 3. 
This is the portion of the record supporting Judge Nehring's 
recusal that is referred to by Judge Atherton in her Memorandum 
Decision denying Patten's motion to dismiss on grounds of double 
jeopardy. 
As did Judge Atherton, many Courts have determined that a 
trial judge's recusal is a valid reason for mistrial. The case of 
State v. Graham, 960 P.2d 457 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1998), is a good 
example of how a judge's decision to recuse himself has been 
addressed by other courts in relation to the bar against double 
jeopardy. In Graham, the defendant had been charged with malicious 
mischief. During the course of the trial, the pro tern judge 
realized that he may have a conflict of interest since a police 
officer from a town for which the Judge acted as City Attorney 
would be testifying. The judge in the Graham case recused himself 
and explained his reasons as follows: 
The Code of Judicial Conduct rule 3(d) (1) 
requires me to disqualify myself because I 
think it could reasonably be expected that my 
impartiality could be questioned. Frankly, it 
wouldn't, but the point is it could be 
reasonably be expected because South Bend is 
my client, on-going client, so I don't think I 
have any choice. 
State v. Graham, at Page 458. 
Utah has a similar section in its Code of Judicial Conduct 
which is found at Canon 3(E) (1, which states: XNA judge shall enter 
a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned..." Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3. 
The Washington Court of Appeals decision in the Graham case 
stated: 
We hold that where the judge correctly decides 
that he must recuse himself, and there is no 
evidence of bad faith conduct by the judge, a 
manifest necessity exists for his recusal. We 
hold that the judge in this case did not abuse 
his discretion in finding a manifest necessity 
and, therefore, Graham's second trial was not 
barred by the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy. 
State v. Graham, at Page 458. 
In the case at bar, Judge Nehring stated that "...in my view 
my continued involvement on this case would be inappropriate..." 
Judge's Ruling p. 3. There is no indication from the record that 
bad faith played any role in Judge Nehring's decision. He 
apparently believed that his exposure to additional information 
about the case either raised a question as to his impartiality or, 
perhaps created a doubt in his own mind about his ability to be 
impartial. Because only Judge Nehring can truly gauge such factors, 
his decision to recuse himself should be accorded great deference. 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Bailey v. State, 465 S.E.2d 284 
(Ga. App. 1995) stated: 
We agree that where the decision for declaring 
a mistrial is bias on the part of the fact 
finder, the trial court's decision to declare 
a mistrial is entitled to the highest 
deference. Although we have held that the 
trial court must consider less drastic 
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alternatives prior to declaring a mistrial, 
there appear to be no alternatives for the 
trial judge to consider in this situation. 
Therefore, we find that, in this instance, the 
trial judge's inability to disregard evidence 
he ruled inadmissable constitutes a manifest 
necessity for mistrial. Accordingly, Bailey's 
double jeopardy rights will not be violated by 
a retrial to a jury. (Citations omitted) 
Bailey v. State, at 286. 
In an analogous case from Pennsylvania, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania reviewed a situation in which the trial court judge 
and the defense counsel had an argument during the course of the 
bench trial. The trial judge admitted that he had adopted a 
"'personal, condemnatory opinion of the entire defense approach and 
strategy" and sua sponte recused himself and declared a mistrial. 
Commonwealth v. Leister, 112 A.2d 332(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
In Leister, the Pennsylvania court stated that the reviewing 
Court should not use a mechanical formula in determining whether a 
trial court had a manifest need to declare a mistrial. Commonwealth 
v. Leister, at 335. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has declined 
to "lay down specific rules in this area." State v. Ambrose, at p. 
359. The Leister court relied on the United States Supreme Court 
case of Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93L.Ed 974 
(1949), in stating "Far more conversant with the factors relevant 
to the determination than any reviewing court can possibly be, the 
trial judge, who is the foremost authority in his or her courtroom, 
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is usually best positioned to determine the necessity of recusal in 
any individual case." Commonwealth v. Leister, at 335. 
The court then went on to state that, "When judges doubt their 
own ability to adjudicate impartially, they should recuse 
themselves. Such an inability to be objective creates a manifest 
necessity for the declaration of a mistrial, particularly when a 
judge must exert the broad discretion that a bench trial demands." 
(Citations omitted) Commonwealth v. Leister, at 335. 
In another Pennsylvania case, the trial court judge realized 
during trial that he had a great familiarity with many of the 
people involved in the case. He stated, "Now I frankly question my 
ability to be objective in this case and would feel better that the 
matter be submitted to a petit jury." Commonwealth v. Smith, 467 
A.2d 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) In the Smith case, the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania agreed with the trial court's decision by stating: 
"Discovery by the sitting judge during a trial 
that a member or members of the jury were 
biased pro or con one side has been held to 
warrant discharge of the jury and direction of 
a new trial." In appellant's case, the trial 
judge sitting as the fact finder recognized 
that he had a bias and on that basis ruled a 
mistrial. In a situation such as this, a 
mistrial clearly was a ^manifest necessity' 
and thus a new trial would not violate 
appellant's double jeopardy rights. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, at 891, [quoting Downum v United States 372 
U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct 1033, 10 L.Ed 2d 100(1963)] 
Although there are no similar recusal/double jeopardy cases in 
Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has provided an opinion as to a 
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judge's obligation to recuse himself under the Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct. In State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988), 
the Court stated, 
However, a judge should recuse himself when 
his "impartiality' might reasonably be 
questioned. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
3(C)(1)(b) (1981).This standard set forth by 
the Code of Judicial Conduct should be given 
careful consideration by the trial judge. It 
may require recusal in instances where no 
actual bias is shown. (Emphasis in original) 
State v. Neeley, p. 1094. 
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Neeley that: "... we do 
not withdraw from the stand this court has taken on previous 
occasions that the integrity of the judicial system should be 
protected against any taint of suspicion." State v. Neeley, p. 
1094. See also, Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 
(1948). See also, In the Interest of Morrow, 583 A.2d 816, 819 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). ("When a judge "believes his impartiality 
can be reasonably questioned,' he should recuse himself, just as he 
should if he himself has doubt as to his ability to preside 
impartially.") 
Another approach to this problem was used by the Supreme Court 
of Michigan. In People v. Hicks. 528 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1994), the 
court found that the midtrial recusal of a trial judge is analogous 
to the situation created by the midtrial disability of a judge. In 
Hicks, the court determined that since the successor judge could 
not proceed in any manner acceptable to the parties, the recusal of 
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the original judge constituted manifest necessity for a mistrial 
and, therefore, retrial was not barred by double jeopardy 
principles. 
Finally, the state of the law in this area has been set forth 
in some detail by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit. In United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th CIR. 
1989), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a case in 
which the trial court judge discovered that the wife of a witness 
was a close personal friend of the judge's wife. Also, prior to 
realizing that she was the wife of a witness, the judge had a 
conversation with the woman in his chambers during a recess. After 
sua sponte raising the issue of recusal, the trial court judge 
decided not to recuse himself but to continue with the trial. It 
was clear from the record that he did not recuse himself because he 
was afraid a retrial would be barred by double jeopardy principles. 
Based upon those facts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that the trial courts judge's decision to not recuse 
himself from a bench trial constituted reversible error. The Court 
stated that Federal judges are governed by 28 U.S.C.A. Section 455 
which provides, among other things, that a judge "shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned." That phrase from Section 455 is 
virtually identical to Canon 3 (E)(1), Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which governs judges in Utah. Federal judges, under 
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Section 455, are required to resolve any doubts they may have in 
favor of disqualification. United States v. Alabama, 824 F.2d 1532 
(11th CIR. 1987), (Cert, denied sub nom) . 
In a lengthy footnote addressing the Kelly trial court's 
concerns about double jeopardy, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated, 
Contrary to the judge's concerns, retrial 
would probably not have been barred in this 
case. Because this issue may recur in future 
cases, we find it appropriate to express our 
view that sua sponte recusal, when properly 
exercised according to any of the requirements 
of section 455, constitutes 'manifest 
necessity' for declaring a mistrial under 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 54 L. Ed. 
2d 717, 98 S. Ct. 824 (1978) . 
It has long been established that retrial 
is barred by double jeopardy principles 
following a mistrial declared over the 
objections of the defendant, absent a showing 
of 'manifest necessity.' See Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 72L.Ed.2d 416, 102 
S. Ct. 2083 (1982); cf. Id. (Retrial normally 
allowed where mistrial is 'declared at the 
behest of the defendant'). In Arizona v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court held that a 
trial judge's declaration of mistrial because 
of prejudicial comments made to the jury by 
defense counsel satisfied the 'manifest 
necessity' standard. The Court held: 'In a 
strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not 
'necessary.' nevertheless, the overriding 
interest in the evenhanded administration of 
justice requires that we accord the highest 
degree of respect to the trial judge's 
evaluation of the likelihood that the 
impartiality of one of more jurors may have 
been affected by the improper comment.' 434 
U.S. at 511; see also id. At 513-14 (noting 
that judge's firsthand familiarity with the 
trial '[militates] in favor of appellate 
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deference to [his] evaluation of the 
significance of possible bias'). Accord Abdi 
v. Georgia, 744 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 
1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 106, 85 L. Ed. 
2d 164, 105 S. Ct. 1871 (1985); see also 
United States v. Cousins, 842 F.2d 1245, 1247 
(11th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 853, 109 S. 
Ct. 139, 102 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1988) (grant of 
mistrial based on possible jury prejudice 
^largely within the discretion of the district 
court') . 
These considerations apply even more 
strongly to the case at bar, which involves a 
judge acting as sole fact finder in a bench 
trial. The Court in Arizona v. Washington held 
that because the judge in that case exercised 
^sound discretion'..., the mistrial order is 
supported by the Ahigh degree' of necessity 
which is required in a case of this kind.' Id. 
At 516. We hold, therefore, that where a trial 
judge properly exercises his discretion to 
recuse himself under section 455, ^manifest 
necessity' is established for any resulting 
mistrial. 
United States of America v. Kelly, Footnote 24. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Judge Atherton 
correctly determined that Judge Nehring's decision to recuse 
himself was sufficient reason to declare a mistrial and that 
retrial of Patten would not be a violation of double jeopardy 
principles. 
c. The trial courts failure to use the phase xlegal necessity' or 
^manifest necessity' in it's rulings does not affect the 
correctness of Judge Atherton's decision. 
Patten was concerned in his brief that neither Judge Nehring 
nor Judge Atherton used the phrase ^manifest necessity' or the 
common Utah phrase "legal necessity" in making their respective 
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rulings. That omission is not a terminal defect that bears on the 
correctness of their decisions. Explicit findings on the presence 
of manifest necessity are not necessary as long as a basis can be 
found in the record. 
In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. 
Ed. 2d 717 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed that 
specific issue in a case involving improper statements made to a 
jury during opening argument. The Supreme Court reversed the 
rulings of the United States District Court and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and stated: 
One final matter requires consideration. 
The absence of an explicit finding of 
^manifest necessity' appears to have been 
determinative for the District Court and may 
have been so for the Court of Appeals. If 
those courts regarded that omission as 
critical, they required too much. Since the 
record provides sufficient justification for 
the state-court ruling, the failure to explain 
that ruling more completely does not render it 
constitutionally defective. (Footnote omitted) 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S., at p.516-517. 
The Supreme Court went on to state: 
The state trial judge's mistrial 
declaration is not subject to collateral 
attack in a federal court simply because he 
failed to find ^manifest necessity' in those 
words or to articulate on the record all the 
factors which informed the deliberate exercise 
of his discretion. 
Arizona v. Washington 434 U.S., at p. 517; see also, State v. 
Callaway 787 P.2d 1247 (N. M. App. 1989). 
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Judge Atherton's decision is correct, despite the fact that 
neither Judge Nehring nor Judge Atherton used the phrase ^manifest 
necessity' in their rulings. Pursuant to §76-1-403(4)(c), the 
trial judge is required to state on the record the reasons for 
mistrial. Judge Nehring's comments on the record regarding his 
knowledge of the case and the inappropriateness of him hearing the 
case meet that standard and constitute ^manifest necessity' 
according to the relevant case law. Judge Atherton correctly 
recognized this, even though the parties were presenting other 
arguments which she chose not to address. 
In this case, the only person who could make the decision as 
to what effect the additional information may have on the fairness 
of the bench trial was Judge Nehring. To second guess his 
decision, and bar retrial based upon double jeopardy, has the 
potential to put trial courts in the extremely awkward position 
that the judge in the Kelly case found himself. In situations 
where there is actual, potential, or the appearance of bias on the 
part of the trial court, the judge will be faced with the dilemma 
of deciding to follow the Canons of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct and recuse himself, thereby risking a double jeopardy bar 
to retrial; or continuing with the trial, thereby risking violating 
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and potentially the fairness of 
the trial. Also, the failure to observe the Canon and recuse when 
appropriate may result in disciplinary action against the judge. 
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State v. Neeley, supra, at p. 1094. If the Supreme Court's 
admonition in Neeley, that "a judge should recuse himself when his 
*impartiality' might reasonably be questioned'' (emphasis in 
original) is to be followed by the trial courts of this state, then 
the trial court judge should be given the deference to determine 
when such recusal is appropriate. State v. Neeley, at p. 1094. It 
also follows that a mistrial cause by the recusal of the trial 
court judge for reasons of actual, potential or the appearance of 
bias must fit squarely within the ^manifest necessity' exception to 
the double jeopardy bar against retrial and the exception contained 
in §76-1-403 (4) (c) (iii) Utah Code Annotated, its state law 
corollary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Judge Atherton 
correctly determined and ruled that Judge Nehring's declaration of 
a mistrial in this case was not a bar to retrial on grounds of 
double jeopardy. Although the parties argued other grounds for the 
mistrial, Judge Atherton held that Judge Nehring's recusal on the 
grounds that he had been privy to too much information about the 
case was a basis for finding that retrial was not barred by Section 
76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated. Also, the midtrial, sua sponte, 
recusal of a judge for bias or potential bias is required by the 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and falls squarely within the 
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^manifest necessity' exception to the double jeopardy provisions of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
Judge Atherton's Memorandum Decision should be affirmed and 
Patten's appeal should be dismissed. 
rtH 
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